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Friday 26 November 2021

A Response to “The New Economic Policy and Contesting Bumiputera Identity among Orang Asli and the Indigenous Peoples of Sabah and Sarawak” by Prof Wan Zawawi Ibrahim

1. I would like to thank the organizer for inviting me to this talk

2. Congratulations to Prof Zawawi for this pertinent work on the NEP and its effects on the indigenous people of Sabah

3. Prof Zawawi’s work is an attempt to explore the philosophical and cultural underpinnings of the NEP, arguing about the responses from the culturally diverse indigenous people of Sabah and Sarawak to the Malay-centric federal model of development. Even though the intention of the NEP was to assist the Bumiputera economically, but it did not necessarily benefit the Bumiputera in Sabah and Sarawak especially the non-Malays and non-Muslims.

4. Prof Zawawi writes comprehensively in his work about how ethnic identities are constructed and the role of the state in it.

5. My presentation is an attempt to complement Prof Zawawi’s work by discussing the role of the political elites in Sabah in constructing and deconstructing the ethnic identities of the indigenous people. I focus mainly on the Kadazandusun political elites.

6.  I will also talk briefly about the indigenous people in Sarawak by looking at the Dayaks and the state’s response to the federal government’s political dominance.

7. Before I proceed, I would like to state that my presentation is not an attempt to discuss and debate the notion of identity or ethnicity, and how it is being embedded in the NEP. Prof Zawawi has done that commendably well in his work. My attempt here is rather modest which is to discuss ethnic identity as a political construct and to examine ethnic politics and its mobilizing power

8. I argue that there are three sources of mobilization used by the Kadazandusun political elites: cultural organizations, political parties and traditional roles of Kadazandusun leadership 

9. Let me start with the construction of the Kadazandusun identity and role of the political elites. From Kadazan, Dusun to Kadazandusun, now there are people who want to promote the term Momogun as an umbrella ethnic name for all the Dusunic, Paitanic and Murutic ethnic groups. 21 Kadazandusun and Murut cultural groups were said to support the move. Their argument was that this would augur well for the socio-economic development and would increase their numerical strength

10. But such a move was not without opposition especially from those who wanted to maintain the Kadazandusun name. Interestingly, if seen from the political lenses, one cannot but argue that the political elites were using the identity issue as a means to mobilize support. At the center of this identity debate were noted Kadazandusun leaders from Kadazandusun-based parties such as PBS and UPKO.

11. This identity debate has resulted in the intra-ethnic rivalry between the Kadazan and Dusun groups, Kadazandusun and Momogun groups, and also among the smaller sub-ethnic groups within the Dusunic, Paitanic and Murutic ethnic groups. While the rivalry is not full blown, the schisms between these various groups can be felt until today

12. So I argue that this unsettling search for ethnic identity and intra-ethnic rivalry have hampered the effort to develop the Kadazandusun economically. Four of the poorest districts in Malaysia are from the Kadazandusun areas

13. The inability of the Kadazandusun political elites to evoke Article 153 and to implement it effectively has also weakened their political influence and economic standing

14. In Sarawak, as it is politically more potent and more insulated from federal politics, identity politics, while germane, is tempered down by regional identity, expressed through slogans such as "Sarawak for Sarawakians" and the stance of local leaders not to allow Peninsular-based parties to set foot in the state

15. But of course, just like Sabah, the persistence of patronage politics and the extractive nature of the state’s economy have marginalized the indigenous people further economically

16. So where do we go from here? I think the intentions of the NEP were noble but the problem was in its implementation. I am inclined to argue that the NEP had benefitted the indigenous people in some ways even though it had not been able to successfully eradicate poverty and create sizeable middle class among the indigenous group. There are still many Kadazandusun and Dayaks, for instance, who are in dire need of economic assistance

17. The key for the successful implementation of future economic policy for the indigenous people in Sabah and Sarawak is decentralisation. When I say decentralisation, I do not necessarily mean political but economic and cultural decentralisation. But first, to avoid ambiguity with regards to the term native as stipulated in the federal constitution, Sabah and Sarawak must be allowed to decide on who is to be regarded as a native according to the state law. Second, the policy has to target the specific needs of the indigenous people. Third, an independent council must be established to monitor the implementation of the policy so that the local elites can be held accountable for their decisions 

18. Thank you