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Tuesday, 5 May 2020

New Malaysia and the Remaking of MA63*


MA63 (Malaysia Agreement 63) is a hot button issue in Sabah and Sarawak. It is an emotive issue just as the Malay rights and Islam to the Malays in Peninsular Malaysia.

What is MA63 and why it is such an important issue in Sabah and Sarawak?

MA63 in an agreement between the United Kingdom, Northern Ireland, Federation of Malaya, North Borneo (Sabah), Sarawak and Singapore (later ceased to become part of the federation in 1965) to form a new nation called Malaysia. Special rights and privileges were given to Sabah and Sarawak as part of their conditions to be incorporated into the new country. The justifications for these rights and privileges were: 1) “Sabah’s and Sarawak’s cultural and religious distinctiveness from Peninsular Malaysia, 2) the huge territories and massive resources they contribute to the federation, 3) problems of poverty and underdevelopment in these states, 4) the 1963 pact between the Federation of Malaya, United Kingdom, North Borneo, Sarawak and Singapore, and 5) international law basis to the guarantees for Sabah and Sarawak” (Shad Saleem 2012, pp. 24)  

The MA63 has eleven articles and annexes. Article 8 in particular necessitates the implementation of the assurances for Sabah and Sarawak as contained in the Inter-Governmental Committee Report.

The signing of the agreement was significant because it paved the way for the enactment of the Malaysia Act (Act No. 26 of 1963) which sealed the formation of Malaysia. With the enactment of the Malaysia Act, the Federal Constitution took over from the Malayan Constitution as a new “document of destiny” for Malaysia (Shad Saleem 2012).

“Breaches” to MA63?

Currently, most debates on MA63 are focused on the breaches to the assurances for Sabah and Sarawak. Sabah and Sarawak accuse the federal government of undermining their autonomy and want their position as “equal partners” and control over natural resources (oil and gas) be restored. They are also unhappy about the tendency of federal authorities to centralise decision-making at the expense of state autonomy. Some of these concerns are genuine and must be rectified. And any attempt to do so must not be based on regional sentiment.

There were attempts by the state and federal governments to address their conflicts but federal-state relations continue to sour. One of the reasons for the persistence of the federal-state conflict is that very often the Sabah and Sarawak issues are exclusively seen from the perspective of East Malaysian only. This problem is compounded further when opportunist politicians use the MA63 to pit East Malaysia against Peninsular Malaysia. Some are more interested in raising the anti-Peninsular Malaysia sentiment rather than solving the core problem of the federal-state conflict. This has to change. Sabah and Sarawak issues must be seen collectively as a national problem.

MA63 should not be seen from the Sabah and Sarawak ‘angle’ alone but from the perspective of the Malaysian federalism. Some people in Peninsular Malaysia perceive MA63 as the struggle to restore the rights of Sabah and Sarawak when in fact it is about strengthening the spirit of the Malaysian federalism. MA63 is about preserving the characters of each of the different entities in the federation.

MA63 is the bedrock of the Malaysian federalism. It lays the foundation for the Federal Constitution that outlines the relationship between the different territories in the federation. The Federal Constitution preserves the special position of Sabah and Sarawak. The rights and privileges for both states are clearly stated in the Federal Constitution (Articles 95D and 95E, 112D, and 161E), spanning financial, legislative, immigration and judicial jurisdictions.

Redefining “Equal Partnership”

Many have interpreted equal partnership based on Article 1 of the MA63 in which the 11 states in the then Malaya are seen as representing one component and the other two components being Sabah and Sarawak. Our founding fathers did not define equal partnership clearly nor was it extensively discussed in the committees tasked to propose the constitutional safeguards for Sabah and Sarawak.

In 1976, Sabah’s and Sarawak’s status is said to be relegated or downgraded to mere “states” just like the other “ordinary” states in Peninsular Malaysia. For some, the amendment was done as part of a nation-building effort to integrate Sabah and Sarawak into Malaysia’s parliamentary federal system (Edmund Langgu 2016). 

On 9 April 2019, a motion was tabled to amend Article 2 (1) of the Federal Constitution to restore Sabah’s and Sarawak’s position as equal partners in the federation. It was, however, failed as out of 197 members of parliaments attended, 138 voted against the motion while 59 abstained.  

The government said it would retable Article 2 (1) but amending it without specifying equal partnership and how it will affect the country’s federal structure will bring us to the path of uncertainty further down the road.

Moving Forward

So, where do we go from here? What do we need to do to address the issues arising from MA63 and in order to move forward in the context of new Malaysia?

First, the provisions of the MA63 must be effectively implemented particularly the recommendations of the Inter-Governmental Committee Report. But before this can be done, the state and federal governments must identify which jurisdictions must be returned to the state or remained under federal control. One way of doing this systematically is through the formation of a federal-state relationship committee to monitor the implementation of federal and state policies and to ensure that the responsibilities of the federal and state department do not overlap.

Second, any attempt to revisit the MA63 must be done with the aim of restructuring the Malaysia federalism in which the states are empowered to make decisions on their own according to their uniqueness and needs. The formation of the MA63 Special Cabinet Committee is commendable but to ensure the sustainability of the Malaysian federalism, the committee should expand its scope to look into the aspect of decentralisation of federal power. There is evidence linking decentralisation with good governance and economic growth (Woo 2019).

Third, the narrative of MA63 in the new Malaysia should be about strengthening the spirit of the Malaysian federalism, creating a sense of belonging to the nation, and increasing a sense of pride towards our nationhood as Malaysians. MA63 is about solidifying and strengthening the relationship between people of Peninsular Malaysia, Sabah and Sarawak. The government could consider choosing any state in Peninsular Malaysia as a host for the celebration of Malaysia Day. By doing this, we acknowledge the fact that MA63 would only be possible with the merging of three distinct territories to form Malaysia. We often hear people saying, “there would be no Malaysia without Sabah and Sarawak”. Similarly, without Malaya as one of the MA63 signatories, Malaysia would not have been possible.

The younger generation yearn for a better Malaysia – a Malaysia that belongs to all irrespective of race, religion and regional origin. They dream of a Malaysia where they can explore their talent and contribute to the development of their country. The new Malaysia is a promising start to realise the aspirations of our founding fathers through MA63.

*This amended version is reproduced here in light of the defiance of the states in observing the Conditional Movement Control Order by the federal government. 

References

Woo Wing Thye (2019). “Decentralisation - the key strategy for New Malaysia”. https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/466349, accessed 26 December 2019.

Edmund Langgu Saga (2016). “The ‘1976 amendment’ is an inclusive nation-building effort”. https://www.malaysiakini.com/letters/360760, accessed 26 December 2019.

Shad Saleem Faruqi (2012). The Bedrock of Our Nation: Our Constitution. Kuala Lumpur: Zubedy Sdn Bhd.


Sabah: breakthrough in the fixed deposit state (published in The Round Table, The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs)

Abstract 

The Malaysian General Election 2018 (GE14) was one of the most anticipated in Malaysia’s political history as it was to determine the fate of Barisan Nasional (BN) under the leadership of the scandal-hit Prime Minister, Najib Razak. As in the 2008 and 2013 general elections, the East Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak once again became the frontline – or ‘fixed deposit’ – states as their support was crucial for BN’s survival. There were multiple claims that BN would return to power in Sabah once again, albeit with a reduced majority considering the strong anti-BN sentiment that was felt across all strata of society. The chances of Parti Warisan Sabah (Warisan), the key opposition party in the state, were downplayed as it was assumed that the party’s strength was only concentrated in the East Coast of Sabah. Hence, to comprehend BN’s defeat in the GE14, it is significant to turn towards the particular affinities and affiliations, particular commonalities and connections, particular stories and self-understandings, particular problems and predicaments of the socio-political dynamics in Sabah. Contrary to the claims that national politics were disconnected from Sabah, ‘problems and predicaments’ emanating from Peninsular Malaysia did indeed have a ‘connection and commonality’ upon the way they impacted people’s voting decision. The external factor of the strong tide of the anti-BN sentiment, fortified with the internal particularities of the political dynamics in the ‘stories and self-understandings’ of constituencies, illustrates how a jolt was caused in BN’s power bases.