Pulse of Progress in Sabah -- A Conversation with Joanna Sue Henley Rampas of Smart Talks Sabah Show (22 December 2023)

Youth and Politics:

JOANNA: How can young people actively engage in political discussions and decision-making processes?

ARNOLD: It is a coordinated endeavor that need to begin at primary and secondary educational institutions before being extended to universities. Youth should be taught civic responsibility from a young age. There are not any specific courses in the school curriculum that address how to become involved in and make a contribution to politics. Regretfully, there is not enough material available on matters like elections and voting. Students should learn about political leadership at the university and how they may help to develop the nation. Political parties have their fair share of responsibility as well. Sabah is home to several political parties, but what efforts do they make to educate the next generation about politics? Also, political parties should establish "political clubs" to educate young party members on topics such as governance, policymaking, and politics.

JOANNA: What role do social media platforms play in shaping the political opinions of the youth?

ARNOLD: Because young people and social media are "inseparable," social media plays a crucial role. For example, one may notice that they are often holding their phone and are also active on Facebook and TikTok. Nevertheless, according to our research, social media functions solely as a medium for accessing information, be it political or entertainment-related, and not as a platform for active political engagement. This implies that young people are mostly consumers of political ideas rather than creators. It is scary that young people can be exposed to false information because of how quickly fake news spreads. 

JOANNA: In your opinion, what challenges do young politicians face in gaining recognition and influence?

ARNOLD: First of all, they work in an environment where patronage and personality politics are still commonplace. Many voters, particularly those who are older, have close ties to the elites of the past. They owe them a great deal. It is so challenging for them to sever these connections and assist the newcomers, especially the young people who like participating in politics. We also have a strong patronage culture in our politics. People demand something from you in return before they can support you. In this way, political support is often founded on patronage rather than being voluntary, ideas-based, or policy-based. Third, the majority of youth also have little interest in politics. Young politicians may find it challenging to persuade their friends to become involved in politics since many consider it to be the "game of the adults" or the "game of the elites."

Undi18 Malaysia:

JOANNA: How has the lowering of the voting age to 18 in Malaysia impacted youth participation in elections?

ARNOLD: It is probably still too early to talk about what will happen. The 2021 state election in Sarawak and the by-election in Jepak show that people between the ages of 18 and 20 were not as widely involved. Many of them did not go to the polls and vote. As mentioned earlier, our task is to get more young people and people who have never voted before to do so and to vote responsibly. This is the reason why political education is important, and universities, educational institutions, NGOs, and political parties should vigorously promote it. 

JOANNA: What measures can be taken to ensure that young voters are well-informed about political issues?

ARNOLD: As I already said, teach people about politics. The young people need to learn why voting is important and what they can do as voters.

JOANNA: Are there any potential challenges or benefits associated with allowing 18-year-olds to vote?

ARNOLD: I believe that in the long run, the good effects will be much greater than the bad ones. Let us start by getting young people involved in politics. This is the first step toward teaching them how the government works and why their involvement is important. Second, letting people aged 18 to vote increases the number of people who can vote and gives more people a chance to choose our leaders in government. This will give young people a chance to have their thoughts heard by the government when decisions are being made.

Federal Government and Borneo State Relations:

JOANNA: What steps can be taken to strengthen the relationship between the federal government and Sabah/Sarawak?

ARNOLD: We need to adopt a pragmatist, strategic, and accommodative stance. It is clear from Sabah's political history that adopting an aggressive and confrontational strategy did not work in our favour. We may keep standing up for our rights, but we must do it in a way that benefits the nation and the state. We are a federation. The structure is there serving as a framework for how authority and responsibilities should be distributed. We also have the Federation Constitution, which informs the state government and the federal government what they can and cannot do. We should wisely and intelligently bargain, make concessions, and stand out for our rights. 

JOANNA: In what ways can the federal government address the unique needs and concerns of Borneo states?

ARNOLD: I believe that now more people are aware of MA63. The fact that MA63 is now acknowledged as our founding document in the Federal Constitution as a result of the historic constitutional amendment in 2021 is also a positive development. By adhering to and respecting MA63, all stakeholders, including the federal and state governments, actively contribute to the strengthening of Malaysia. Moving forward, any policy that is implemented should be customized to suit the unique requirements of Sabah and Sarawak. I believe that we are currently progressing in the correct way. 

JOANNA: How might a more collaborative approach between the federal and state governments benefit the overall development of Sabah and Sarawak?

ARNOLD: A strategic synergy between the federal and state governments is needed. When both work together, everyone benefits. As I said before, the Federation Constitution and MA63 serve as our guides for running the federation.

Moving Sabah Forward:

JOANNA: What key economic strategies do you believe will contribute to the growth and development of Sabah? In what areas can the government focus to enhance education and healthcare services in Sabah?

ARNOLD: First, it is important that we abolish the "extractive economic" model, which exclusively benefits a select few elites and those in positions of authority. Inclusive economic strategies and institutions that foster broad participation and incentivize talent and innovation are essential. Sabah possesses an abundance of natural resources. Our primary problem is that we do not permit competent individuals to manage them. To put it simply, we lack competent managers who can manage our natural resources. We will persist in descending into the "poorest state" as long as we permit individuals lacking the necessary expertise to take charge of our resources. Additionally, Sabah must foster an environment that encourages young talents to realize their full potential. Our tourism sector is one of our major strong points. However, our tourism industry's sustainability and infrastructural deficiency are the problems. While visitors appreciate our natural treasures, we allow them to do so at the risk of the tourism sector's long-term viability. What steps are we doing to guarantee that future generations can continue to enjoy all of the top tourist destinations? Additionally, we must prioritize the development of human capital that corresponds with industry demands, including artificial intelligence, renewable energy, and so forth. That does not imply that the humanities and the arts are unimportant. However, in order to ensure that our arts and humanities students are not excluded, what measures can we take to enable them to utilize their arts and humanities background in support of Sabah's progress?

Analysis: How Sarawak manages to pass two landmark laws in Malaysia, even ahead of the federal government

I commented on the two landmark laws in Sarawak and provided my reasons on why Sarawak is ahead of its neighbour Sabah particularly in championing MA63. 

Link: https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/malaysia-sarawak-sabah-borneo-ombudsman-climate-change-emission-bills-3939131

Resurgence of regional coalitions in Sarawak and Sabah since the federal elections of 2018 and 2022

Arnold Puyok & Hafizan Mohamad Naim 

Abstract 

This article examines the resurgence of regional coalitions in Sarawak and Sabah following the 14th and 15th General Elections, respectively. It shows how federal-level government changes in Malaysia can result in the realignment of regional parties in Sarawak and Sabah, which had significantly shaped Malaysia’s political landscape as BN’s frontline states. The resurgence of the regional coalitions, Gabungan Parti Sarawak (GPS) and Gabungan Rakyat Sabah (GRS), demonstrates not only the fragmentation of national politics and the rise of regionalism but also the ease with which regional parties dominated by strongmen and aided by patronage can realign, enter and exit coalitions.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1080/00358533.2023.2221913

A Response to “The New Economic Policy and Contesting Bumiputera Identity among Orang Asli and the Indigenous Peoples of Sabah and Sarawak” by Prof Wan Zawawi Ibrahim

1. I would like to thank the organizer for inviting me to this talk

2. Congratulations to Prof Zawawi for this pertinent work on the NEP and its effects on the indigenous people of Sabah

3. Prof Zawawi’s work is an attempt to explore the philosophical and cultural underpinnings of the NEP, arguing about the responses from the culturally diverse indigenous people of Sabah and Sarawak to the Malay-centric federal model of development. Even though the intention of the NEP was to assist the Bumiputera economically, but it did not necessarily benefit the Bumiputera in Sabah and Sarawak especially the non-Malays and non-Muslims.

4. Prof Zawawi writes comprehensively in his work about how ethnic identities are constructed and the role of the state in it.

5. My presentation is an attempt to complement Prof Zawawi’s work by discussing the role of the political elites in Sabah in constructing and deconstructing the ethnic identities of the indigenous people. I focus mainly on the Kadazandusun political elites.

6.  I will also talk briefly about the indigenous people in Sarawak by looking at the Dayaks and the state’s response to the federal government’s political dominance.

7. Before I proceed, I would like to state that my presentation is not an attempt to discuss and debate the notion of identity or ethnicity, and how it is being embedded in the NEP. Prof Zawawi has done that commendably well in his work. My attempt here is rather modest which is to discuss ethnic identity as a political construct and to examine ethnic politics and its mobilizing power

8. I argue that there are three sources of mobilization used by the Kadazandusun political elites: cultural organizations, political parties and traditional roles of Kadazandusun leadership 

9. Let me start with the construction of the Kadazandusun identity and role of the political elites. From Kadazan, Dusun to Kadazandusun, now there are people who want to promote the term Momogun as an umbrella ethnic name for all the Dusunic, Paitanic and Murutic ethnic groups. 21 Kadazandusun and Murut cultural groups were said to support the move. Their argument was that this would augur well for the socio-economic development and would increase their numerical strength

10. But such a move was not without opposition especially from those who wanted to maintain the Kadazandusun name. Interestingly, if seen from the political lenses, one cannot but argue that the political elites were using the identity issue as a means to mobilize support. At the center of this identity debate were noted Kadazandusun leaders from Kadazandusun-based parties such as PBS and UPKO.

11. This identity debate has resulted in the intra-ethnic rivalry between the Kadazan and Dusun groups, Kadazandusun and Momogun groups, and also among the smaller sub-ethnic groups within the Dusunic, Paitanic and Murutic ethnic groups. While the rivalry is not full blown, the schisms between these various groups can be felt until today

12. So I argue that this unsettling search for ethnic identity and intra-ethnic rivalry have hampered the effort to develop the Kadazandusun economically. Four of the poorest districts in Malaysia are from the Kadazandusun areas

13. The inability of the Kadazandusun political elites to evoke Article 153 and to implement it effectively has also weakened their political influence and economic standing

14. In Sarawak, as it is politically more potent and more insulated from federal politics, identity politics, while germane, is tempered down by regional identity, expressed through slogans such as "Sarawak for Sarawakians" and the stance of local leaders not to allow Peninsular-based parties to set foot in the state

15. But of course, just like Sabah, the persistence of patronage politics and the extractive nature of the state’s economy have marginalized the indigenous people further economically

16. So where do we go from here? I think the intentions of the NEP were noble but the problem was in its implementation. I am inclined to argue that the NEP had benefitted the indigenous people in some ways even though it had not been able to successfully eradicate poverty and create sizeable middle class among the indigenous group. There are still many Kadazandusun and Dayaks, for instance, who are in dire need of economic assistance

17. The key for the successful implementation of future economic policy for the indigenous people in Sabah and Sarawak is decentralisation. When I say decentralisation, I do not necessarily mean political but economic and cultural decentralisation. But first, to avoid ambiguity with regards to the term native as stipulated in the federal constitution, Sabah and Sarawak must be allowed to decide on who is to be regarded as a native according to the state law. Second, the policy has to target the specific needs of the indigenous people. Third, an independent council must be established to monitor the implementation of the policy so that the local elites can be held accountable for their decisions 

18. Thank you    

A Cultural Shift Needed to Stop Party Hopping

Of late there has been much discussion on party hopping particularly in Sabah. Sabah has been the focus due to the penchant of its assemblymen to hop from one party to another; it is also understandable why Sabah is under the radar because its electorates are known to have changed their government at least five times.

The debates on party hopping revolve around whether an anti-hop law should be enacted to prevent assemblymen from switching party.

While technically an anti-hop law can provide some sort of deterrence to prevent party switching, it is not the be-all and end-all solution to address the larger issue of politician hopping at his whims and at the expense of the electorates he represents.

The issue of party hopping at least in the context of Sabah politics is already ingrained and has become part of the political culture of the state. Let’s look deeper into the justifications made by the two assemblymen recently who ditched the PH-Warisan-UPKO coalition and became PN-friendly. This is not the first time that our politicians tell us that the reason for them to leave their party is because they need to fulfill the “development needs” of their electorates which is only possible with a good working relationships with the ruling federal government.

Question: why cannot the respective federal government apparatuses be mobilised to assist the state opposition-held constituencies? Why must an opposition assemblyman subscribes to the ruling federal government’s partisan stance if he were to benefit from the development funds contributed by the non-partisan taxpayers’ money?

Is it the system that needs to be changed in order to discourage party hopping due to unfairness in which development funds are distributed? 

If it is, to disincentivise an assemblyman from ditching his party, a mechanism has to be put in place to ensure that development aid is distributed fairly based on the pressing needs of the electorates – and let’s say if the assemblyman thinks that he is being discriminated against, he can lodge a complaint to an ombudsman body (or a Grant Commission, whatever names one wants to call it) specifically looking at facilitation of inter-governmental cooperation and distribution of development funds. This is something that can be looked into before an anti-hop law is fully enacted.

If the “development argument” is just a “cover” to justify the above said assemblymen’s craving for power and personal greed, the solution for party hopping could only be found if our society is ready for a cultural shift led by the new generation of leaders.

Coming back to the issue of party hopping as a “culture” in Sabah. Sabah politics is very personality-driven. Political parties are formed by leading figures and disbanded – some abruptly – after the leaders are no longer active in politics. So, the party followers, instead of committing to the vision and ideals of the party, are loyal to the party leaders particularly when they are in power. Once the incentive to seek patronage support diminishes, the party will be dissolved and the leaders and their followers will either form a new party or join the existing one.

The approach to create a new political culture starts with education.

The party has a role to play as an agent to educate its members about politics, policy-making and the importance of voting conscientiously. Schools and universities play a vital role as well – the existing syllabi must be revamped to take into account the dynamics of politics in this changing era. Those 18 year-old Malaysians who will be voters soon will find themselves empowered to take part in charting the country’s future – but before they can use this “democratic power” they must first be guided and provided with the tools to make informed choices.

Only the young leaders of today can change the political culture of the country. They have seen a lot already and understand more the sentiments of the voters who yearn for progressive and transparent leadership. There is a potential for the young leaders not to repeat the mistakes of their older comrades and to introduce a new brand of politics based on principles, pragmatism and progressivism.

Coming back to the issue of party hopping. It is more than enacting a law to address what is already deeply rooted in the political culture of the country. The present institutions and laws can be strengthened to check the conducts of politicians. Only the new generation of leaders can stop the practice of party hopping by promoting a new political culture grounded in professionalism, ethics and accountability.  

New Malaysia and the Remaking of MA63*

MA63 (Malaysia Agreement 63) is a hot button issue in Sabah and Sarawak. It is an emotive issue just as the Malay rights and Islam to the Malays in Peninsular Malaysia.

What is MA63 and why it is such an important issue in Sabah and Sarawak?

MA63 in an agreement between the United Kingdom, Northern Ireland, Federation of Malaya, North Borneo (Sabah), Sarawak and Singapore (later ceased to become part of the federation in 1965) to form a new nation called Malaysia. Special rights and privileges were given to Sabah and Sarawak as part of their conditions to be incorporated into the new country. The justifications for these rights and privileges were: 1) “Sabah’s and Sarawak’s cultural and religious distinctiveness from Peninsular Malaysia, 2) the huge territories and massive resources they contribute to the federation, 3) problems of poverty and underdevelopment in these states, 4) the 1963 pact between the Federation of Malaya, United Kingdom, North Borneo, Sarawak and Singapore, and 5) international law basis to the guarantees for Sabah and Sarawak” (Shad Saleem 2012, pp. 24)  

The MA63 has eleven articles and annexes. Article 8 in particular necessitates the implementation of the assurances for Sabah and Sarawak as contained in the Inter-Governmental Committee Report.

The signing of the agreement was significant because it paved the way for the enactment of the Malaysia Act (Act No. 26 of 1963) which sealed the formation of Malaysia. With the enactment of the Malaysia Act, the Federal Constitution took over from the Malayan Constitution as a new “document of destiny” for Malaysia (Shad Saleem 2012).

“Breaches” to MA63?

Currently, most debates on MA63 are focused on the breaches to the assurances for Sabah and Sarawak. Sabah and Sarawak accuse the federal government of undermining their autonomy and want their position as “equal partners” and control over natural resources (oil and gas) be restored. They are also unhappy about the tendency of federal authorities to centralise decision-making at the expense of state autonomy. Some of these concerns are genuine and must be rectified. And any attempt to do so must not be based on regional sentiment.

There were attempts by the state and federal governments to address their conflicts but federal-state relations continue to sour. One of the reasons for the persistence of the federal-state conflict is that very often the Sabah and Sarawak issues are exclusively seen from the perspective of East Malaysian only. This problem is compounded further when opportunist politicians use the MA63 to pit East Malaysia against Peninsular Malaysia. Some are more interested in raising the anti-Peninsular Malaysia sentiment rather than solving the core problem of the federal-state conflict. This has to change. Sabah and Sarawak issues must be seen collectively as a national problem.

MA63 should not be seen from the Sabah and Sarawak ‘angle’ alone but from the perspective of the Malaysian federalism. Some people in Peninsular Malaysia perceive MA63 as the struggle to restore the rights of Sabah and Sarawak when in fact it is about strengthening the spirit of the Malaysian federalism. MA63 is about preserving the characters of each of the different entities in the federation.

MA63 is the bedrock of the Malaysian federalism. It lays the foundation for the Federal Constitution that outlines the relationship between the different territories in the federation. The Federal Constitution preserves the special position of Sabah and Sarawak. The rights and privileges for both states are clearly stated in the Federal Constitution (Articles 95D and 95E, 112D, and 161E), spanning financial, legislative, immigration and judicial jurisdictions.

Redefining “Equal Partnership”

Many have interpreted equal partnership based on Article 1 of the MA63 in which the 11 states in the then Malaya are seen as representing one component and the other two components being Sabah and Sarawak. Our founding fathers did not define equal partnership clearly nor was it extensively discussed in the committees tasked to propose the constitutional safeguards for Sabah and Sarawak.

In 1976, Sabah’s and Sarawak’s status is said to be relegated or downgraded to mere “states” just like the other “ordinary” states in Peninsular Malaysia. For some, the amendment was done as part of a nation-building effort to integrate Sabah and Sarawak into Malaysia’s parliamentary federal system (Edmund Langgu 2016). 

On 9 April 2019, a motion was tabled to amend Article 2 (1) of the Federal Constitution to restore Sabah’s and Sarawak’s position as equal partners in the federation. It was, however, failed as out of 197 members of parliaments attended, 138 voted against the motion while 59 abstained.  

The government said it would retable Article 2 (1) but amending it without specifying equal partnership and how it will affect the country’s federal structure will bring us to the path of uncertainty further down the road.

Moving Forward

So, where do we go from here? What do we need to do to address the issues arising from MA63 and in order to move forward in the context of new Malaysia?

First, the provisions of the MA63 must be effectively implemented particularly the recommendations of the Inter-Governmental Committee Report. But before this can be done, the state and federal governments must identify which jurisdictions must be returned to the state or remained under federal control. One way of doing this systematically is through the formation of a federal-state relationship committee to monitor the implementation of federal and state policies and to ensure that the responsibilities of the federal and state department do not overlap.

Second, any attempt to revisit the MA63 must be done with the aim of restructuring the Malaysia federalism in which the states are empowered to make decisions on their own according to their uniqueness and needs. The formation of the MA63 Special Cabinet Committee is commendable but to ensure the sustainability of the Malaysian federalism, the committee should expand its scope to look into the aspect of decentralisation of federal power. There is evidence linking decentralisation with good governance and economic growth (Woo 2019).

Third, the narrative of MA63 in the new Malaysia should be about strengthening the spirit of the Malaysian federalism, creating a sense of belonging to the nation, and increasing a sense of pride towards our nationhood as Malaysians. MA63 is about solidifying and strengthening the relationship between people of Peninsular Malaysia, Sabah and Sarawak. The government could consider choosing any state in Peninsular Malaysia as a host for the celebration of Malaysia Day. By doing this, we acknowledge the fact that MA63 would only be possible with the merging of three distinct territories to form Malaysia. We often hear people saying, “there would be no Malaysia without Sabah and Sarawak”. Similarly, without Malaya as one of the MA63 signatories, Malaysia would not have been possible.

The younger generation yearn for a better Malaysia – a Malaysia that belongs to all irrespective of race, religion and regional origin. They dream of a Malaysia where they can explore their talent and contribute to the development of their country. The new Malaysia is a promising start to realise the aspirations of our founding fathers through MA63.

*This amended version is reproduced here in light of the defiance of the states in observing the Conditional Movement Control Order by the federal government. 

References

Woo Wing Thye (2019). “Decentralisation - the key strategy for New Malaysia”. https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/466349, accessed 26 December 2019.

Edmund Langgu Saga (2016). “The ‘1976 amendment’ is an inclusive nation-building effort”. https://www.malaysiakini.com/letters/360760, accessed 26 December 2019.

Shad Saleem Faruqi (2012). The Bedrock of Our Nation: Our Constitution. Kuala Lumpur: Zubedy Sdn Bhd.

Sabah: breakthrough in the fixed deposit state (published in The Round Table, The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs)

Abstract 

The Malaysian General Election 2018 (GE14) was one of the most anticipated in Malaysia’s political history as it was to determine the fate of Barisan Nasional (BN) under the leadership of the scandal-hit Prime Minister, Najib Razak. As in the 2008 and 2013 general elections, the East Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak once again became the frontline – or ‘fixed deposit’ – states as their support was crucial for BN’s survival. There were multiple claims that BN would return to power in Sabah once again, albeit with a reduced majority considering the strong anti-BN sentiment that was felt across all strata of society. The chances of Parti Warisan Sabah (Warisan), the key opposition party in the state, were downplayed as it was assumed that the party’s strength was only concentrated in the East Coast of Sabah. Hence, to comprehend BN’s defeat in the GE14, it is significant to turn towards the particular affinities and affiliations, particular commonalities and connections, particular stories and self-understandings, particular problems and predicaments of the socio-political dynamics in Sabah. Contrary to the claims that national politics were disconnected from Sabah, ‘problems and predicaments’ emanating from Peninsular Malaysia did indeed have a ‘connection and commonality’ upon the way they impacted people’s voting decision. The external factor of the strong tide of the anti-BN sentiment, fortified with the internal particularities of the political dynamics in the ‘stories and self-understandings’ of constituencies, illustrates how a jolt was caused in BN’s power bases.

KEYWORDS: Sabah, Kadazandusun, Malaysian General Election (GE14), Malaysian Agreement 1963, autonomy, federal-state relations

More here: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00358533.2020.1741888